SOME THOUGHTS ON JUDGMENTS, RECIPROCITY, AND
THE SEEMING PARADOX OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
RICHARD W. HULBERT'

The purpose of this essay is to invite reflection on the recent
initiative to introduce a mandatory requirement of reciprocity as a
prerequisite to the enforcement in the United States of foreign
country judgments.
The international enforceability of judgments is, quite
reasonably, thought to be relevant to the efficiency of international
business. The enforceability of foreign judgments invites, in turn,
consideration of the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, for
whatever may be the difficulties that confront the international
enforcement of court judgments, there stands in striking contrast
the comparative ease with which arbitral awards (whether
rendered in the United States or elsewhere) are enforced around
the world. Is this an anomaly, or are there lessons to be learned?
After all, court judgments are the decisions of professional judges
operating in public under detailed rules of procedure designed to
assure justice, and these decisions are subject to appellate review.
An award, on the other hand, represents a decision rendered by
arbitrators -who need have no particular training or experience
and who are not directly responsible to any national judicial
system -reached after proceedings normally conducted in private
under procedures that may well have been largely fashioned for
the particular occasion. Moreover, the award is a decision which,
in principle, is subject to no review on the merits.1
* The author is Senior Counsel to the law firm of Cleary Gottlieb Steen &
Hamilton LLP and an Adjunct Professor at the New York University School of
Law.
1 This is ancient learning: "If the award is within the submission, and
contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the
parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact. A
contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of the chancellor in place
of the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the
commencement, not the end, of litigation." Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349
(1854).
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If the enforcement of foreign judgments were to be analyzed
from the perspective of the modern treatment accorded such
judgments in the courts of the United States, one would not be
impressed by concern for difficulties. That was not always true. In
2
1895, the Supreme Court, in its famous decision in Hilton v. Guyot,
by a vote of 5-4 refused to give effect to a French judgment against
an American that it otherwise judged entitled to enforcement. The
ground for the decision was that, in the reverse case, the French
court would have refused to enforce an American judgment
against French citizens. The decision in Guyot did not, however,
prove to define the American view. The foundation stone for the
modern American majority view was a unanimous decision of the
New York Court of Appeals thirty years after Guyot rejecting
reciprocity as a requirement for enforcement of a foreign
3
judgment.
Once again, a French judgment against an American was at
issue. The American, who had unsuccessfully brought suit in
France, commenced a second suit on the same claim against the
same defendant in New York. The defendant pleaded the French
judgment as res judicata. The plaintiff contended that the French
judgment should be denied recognition because, at the time, the
French courts still did not recognize foreign (including American)
judgments but instead subjected them to a review of the merits, the
famous rivision au fond. The plaintiff had no other criticism of the
French proceedings or the resulting French judgment. The lower
court and the Appellate Division accepted the American plaintiff's
position on the authority of Hilton v. Guyot and, on the merits of
the claim, held for the plaintiff. The New York Court of Appeals,
in a unanimous opinion by Judge Pound, reversed and held the
French judgment conclusive. In doing so, it declined to regard
Hilton v. Guyot as controlling:
But the question is one of private rather than public
international law, of private right rather than public
relations, and our courts will recognize private rights
acquired under foreign laws and the sufficiency of the
evidence establishing such rights. A right acquired under a
foreign judgment may be established in this state without
reference to the rules of evidence laid down by the courts of
2
3

159 U.S. 113 (1895).
Johnston v. Compagnie G~n~rale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1926).
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the United States. Comity is not a rule of law, but it is a
rule of 'practice, convenience and expediency.
It is
something more than mere courtesy... since it has a
substantial value in securing uniformity of decision, and
discouraging repeated litigation of the same question.' It
therefore rests, not on the basis of reciprocity, but rather
upon the persuasiveness of the foreign judgment. When
the whole of the facts appear to have been inquired into by
the French courts, judicially, honestly, and with full
jurisdiction and with the intention to arrive at the right
conclusion . . . it should no longer be open to the party
invoking the foreign court against a resident of France to
ask the American court to sit as a court of appeal from that
which gave the judgment. 4
It bears noting that had the French judgment in Johnston been
an award in arbitration conducted in France at any time since the
United States acceded to the New York Convention in 1970, the
award could not have been challenged on the merits. Furthermore,
in the absence of any of the narrow range of objections permitted
by Article V of the Convention, the American court could not have
refused to recognize and enforce the judgment.5
The rejection of a requirement of reciprocity in the Johnston
decision came to represent the predominant American view of the
matter. It was subsequently reflected in the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which as adopted in most of
the more than 30 states that have enacted it does not recognize lack

Id. at 123 (citations omitted).
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New
York Convention]. The implementing federal statute provides that a federal court
before which an award "falling under the Convention" may come "shall confirm
the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition
or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention." 9 U.S.C. § 207
(2000). The Convention grounds permitting recognition to be refused are the
procedural deficiencies specified in Article V(1)(a)-(d), the annulment of the
award where rendered (Article V(1)(e)), and the two grounds set forth in Article
V(2): that the subject matter of the award was not capable of settlement by
arbitration under American law or that enforcement of the award "would be
contrary to the public policy" of the United States. The public policy ground has
been narrowly construed. See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe
Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
4
5
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of reciprocity as a defense. 6 Whatever may once have been the
status of "general federal law" on this subject, since the Supreme
Court's 1938 decision in the Erie case, 7 federal courts exercising
diversity jurisdiction have followed state law on the question of
reciprocity. 8 The proposition that reciprocity is not a prerequisite
to enforcement of a foreign judgment in the United States is also
reflected in the American Law Institute's Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws 9 and Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States. 10
The established doctrine faithfully reflects the special
significance that American jurisprudence attaches to putting an
end to litigation. Not only have we, like other judicial systems,
accepted the concept of res judicata, but we have gone further to
embrace the concepts of defensive and offensive non-mutual
collateral estoppel." One is drawn to conclude that the dominant
policy reflected in current American recognition law, as it has
developed, is a preference for rendering justice in the particular
case rather than sacrificing that objective in the pursuit of more
abstract normative objectives.
Three-quarters of a century of relatively well-established law
has now been cast into question by the proposition that:
A foreign judgment shall not be recognized or enforced in a
court in the United States [that is to say, in any American
court, state or federal] if the court finds that comparable
judgments of courts in the United States would not be
recognized or enforced in the courts of the state of origin.

6 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTs RECOGNITION ACT,

13 U.L.A. pt. 2, at 39

(Supp. 2006).
7

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

8

See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.

1971).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971).
10 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 481-82 (1987).
11 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (sustaining offensive
non-mutual collateral estoppel); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found.,
402 U.S. 313 (1971) (sanctioning so-called "defensive" non-mutual collateral
estoppel). These concepts do not appear to be accepted in foreign country res
judicata doctrine. See Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country
Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 61-70 (1984) (reviewing issue
preclusion under English, French, German, Argentine, Japanese, Swedish, and
Mexican law).
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That is the text of section 7(a) of the proposed federal statute on
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments recently
approved by the American Law Institute.12 The proponents of this
major reversal of American law insist that they are not opponents
of the recognition of foreign judgments. On the contrary, the basic
contention-and indeed almost the only argument-urged in
support of the reciprocity requirement is that the generous
American recognition practice has created no incentive for our
commercial trading partners to dismantle obstacles placed in the
path of the recognition of American judgments abroad.
The purpose of the reciprocity provision in this Act is not to
make it more difficult to secure recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, but rather to create an
incentive for foreign countries to commit to recognition and
13
enforcement of judgments rendered in the United States.
In the long run, say the proponents of reciprocity, introducing a
reciprocity requirement in American law will force other countries
to rethink their ways and thus ultimately further the international
recognition and enforcement of judgments.
There is no basis whatever to question the sincerity of the
Reporters in that insistence. Nor, more broadly, is there ground to
challenge the high quality and total professionalism of the ALI
project. Although intended as a statute, the text is presented in the
customary format of an ALI restatement. The "black letter" text of
the proposed statute is elaborated in many thoughtful Comments
and accompanied by the invaluable research reflected in the
extensive Reporters' Notes. (It is interesting to speculate how
much of the Comments and Notes, if the statute were enacted,
would constitute citable "legislative history.") If one accepts the
premises of the project, it cannot be imagined how the work of the
Reporters could have been better done.

12 FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT

ACT § 7(a) (Proposed

2005), in AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE

(2006) [hereinafter ALI

ANALYSIS &

PROPOSED STATUTE].
13 FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 7 cmt. b.
(Proposed 2005), in ALI ANALYSIS & PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 12. Section 7(e)
of the proposed statute authorizes the Secretary of State "to negotiate agreements
with foreign states or groups of states setting forth reciprocal practices concerning
recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in the United States." Id. §
7(e).
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This seriously considered proposal, which was controversial at
the AL114 and is sharply debated in the literature, 15 invites
consideration of four points and a preliminary question.
The first of the four points poses the issue of what (if anything)
we are to make of the fact that the specific circumstance that gave
rise to the felt need to create a reciprocity requirement, the Hague
Conference negotiations, no longer exists. Indeed, at that time,
because of the international negotiations then in progress, it may
be that no other position on the issue of reciprocity could have
been taken. Those negotiations, however, did not succeed. Should
we now look for guidance to the ancient adage Cessante ratione,
cessat ipsa lex? (See Point 2, below).
Second, the introduction of a reciprocity requirement will
impose burdens, possibly substantial burdens. It will necessarily
lead to duplicate litigation on the merits of cases where the foreign
judgment has been denied recognition in the United States for lack
of reciprocity. It may well spawn a cottage industry in collateral
litigation over whether the requirements of reciprocity have been
met. (See Point 3, below).
Third, a further resulting burden of the introduction of the
reciprocity requirement is that it must necessarily operate to the
prejudice of the litigants who have already tried their case once to
a judgment that otherwise meets the requirements for recognition.
(See Point 4, below).
The fourth point is not so much a proposition as a question:
will this pressure point-the introduction of a requirement of
reciprocity-in fact lead to a material improvement in the
reception of American judgments abroad? (See Point 5, below).
1.
But first, the preliminary question: what, in fact, is the state of
play with respect to recognition and enforcement of American
judgments abroad, for it is the perception that such judgments fare
"The membership of the Institute was divided on whether a federal statute
concerning foreign judgments should contain a reciprocity requirement .. " ALl
ANALYSIS & PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 12, at xiii.
15 See, e.g., Franklin 0. Ballard, Comment, Turnabout is Fair Play: Mhy a
Reciprocity Requirement Should Be Included in the America Law Institute's Proposed
Federal Statute, 28 HoUS. J. INT'L L. 199 (2006) (favoring a reciprocity requirement);
Katherine R. Miller, Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom of Writing a
Reciprocity Requirement into U.S. International Recognition and Enforcement Law, 35
GEO. J. INT'L L. 239 (2004) (opposing such a requirement).
14
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badly, in ways that a reciprocity requirement would ameliorate,
that is the engine driving the project. It would seem obvious that
this starting point should be firmly established, but it appears that
this is a subject on which reliable evidence is unavailable. One
authority has confessed that "broad empirical evidence regarding
the enforcement of American judgments abroad is hard to find,"
although noting "significant anecdotal evidence." 16 Another writer
states that "[a]lthough there are many scholarly works that discuss
the perceived problems litigants face in seeking recognition and
enforcement of U.S. judgments, this perception currently is not
supported by empirical data," noting that his anecdotal evidence
17
did not indicate difficulties in enforcing U.S. judgments abroad.
A third commentator laments the absence of "[c]urrent reliable
18
data on the reception of U.S. judgments abroad...."
The most detailed recent consideration of the question appears
to be a survey conducted under the auspices of the Committee on
Foreign and Comparative Law of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York. The survey covered twelve countries: Canada
and Mexico in the Western Hemisphere; South Africa; Japan, China
(the People's Republic of China, that is), and Hong Kong in Asia;
and six countries in Europe: England, France, Belgium, Italy,
Spain, and Switzerland. 19 The survey found no official antiAmerican bias, as such, but it did note various problems in the
enforcement of American judgments.
The principal problem stems from the fact that, because the

16 Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party

Autonomy and Providing An Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 548
(2005).
17 Matthew H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They Come? -The
Need For a
Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary
Judgments, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 79, 82 (1994) (footnotes omitted). The author
states that he conducted "an informal telephone survey of attorneys throughout
the United States with the assistance of the state bar associations of Florida, Texas
and New York. This survey yielded no attorneys with negative experience in
enforcing U.S. judgments abroad." Id. at 82 n. 11.
18 Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need For A JudgmentsRecognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 167, 171 (1998). He adds that "[i]f, as I suspect, judgments obtained by
U.S. lawyers who follow proper procedures are readily recognized and enforced
abroad, there is little need for a convention .. " Id.
19 The Comm. on Foreign & Comparative Law, Survey on Foreign Recognition
of U.S. Money Judgments, 56 REc. ASS'N BAR CITY N.Y. 378 (2001) [hereinafter City
Bar Survey].
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United States is not a party to any judgments conventions, 20
American judgment creditors never have access to the simpler,
cheaper, quicker avenues for enforcement provided by treaty.
Instead they must proceed by common law action (as in England,
Canada, South Africa, and Hong Kong) or under residual statutory
procedures in civil law countries. These alternative approaches are
more complicated, slower, and in some cases present uncertainty
21
in points of detail.
Different concepts of jurisdiction may create another set of
problems. For example, "tag jurisdiction," which the Supreme
Court recently validated, 22 is generally regarded as "exorbitant,"
and a judgment based on it or U.S.-style "long-arm" jurisdiction
may be denied enforcement. 23
The definition of what constitutes a "civil" judgment (as
distinct from an administrative or penal judgment) may present
24
another problem.
The treble damages awarded in civil antitrust litigation and the
sometimes gaudy punitive damages awarded in American tort
judgments are likely to present problems almost everywhere.2 5
Then there is reciprocity itself, required by some of the
countries surveyed, but not by all (not by England, Belgium, or
20 The Choice of Courts Convention, concluded June 30, 2005, at the Hague
Conference, which was signed on behalf of the United States, will change this in a
modest way, if the Convention comes into effect and is ratified by the United
States.
21 City Bar Survey, supra note 19, at 382-83.
22 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
23 City Bar Survey, supra note 19, at 384-89. See also Friedrich K. Juenger, A
Shoe Unfit For Globetrotting,28 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 1027, 1040 (1995) ("The difficulty
of presenting our confused jurisdictional law to the outside world is bound to
impede the negotiation of recognition treaties and conventions with foreign
nations.").
24 City Bar Survey, supra note 19, at 394.
25 Id. at 391. So common is foreign resistance to such judgments that the
proposed ALI statute incorporates a special provision in proposed Section 7(d)
excluding them from consideration:

Denial by courts of the state of origin [of the foreign judgment sought to
be recognized] of enforcement of judgments for punitive, exemplary or
multiple damages shall not be regarded as denial of reciprocal
enforcement of judgments for the purposes of this section if the courts of
the state of origin would enforce the compensatory portion of such
judgments.
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 7(d) (Proposed 2005),
in ALI ANALYSIS & PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 12.
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South Africa, and no longer required in Switzerland after the
recent enactment of the Private International Law Act).26 The
general tenor of current American recognition practice offers what
would seem to constitute reciprocity, but as current American
recognition law is state law (the proposed ALI statute would
change this but not eliminate state court jurisdiction 27), there has
been an issue as to how American reciprocity is to be judged (to
what forum does one look?). Until the proposed new substantive
law is reflected in consistent judicial decisions, that problem may
well continue.
What these difficulties represent quantitatively, however, it
seems we do not know. How many American judgment creditors
attempt enforcement abroad?
How many of those attempts
succeed? What explains the failure of those that do not succeed?
How many American judgment creditors do not attempt to enforce
their judgments abroad because they are dissuaded by real or
supposed obstacles? Looking at the other side of the question, how
important is enforcement in the United States of judgments
obtained in other countries, i.e., what leverage do we really have?
On none of these points have we seen serious data. Had there not
been the pressure of the Hague negotiations, it seems unlikely that
so substantial a change in American law as the introduction of a
mandatory reciprocity requirement would have been proposed
against a background of such uncertainty.
2.
The origin of the proposed reciprocity requirement lay in the
long, drawn-out, and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations for a
general jurisdiction and judgments convention under the auspices
28
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
The American Law Institute project "began with the
City Bar Survey, supra note 19, at 400-01.
The proposed statute would impose a nationwide substantive federal law
on recognition and enforcement; it would not, however, eliminate concurrent
state court jurisdiction but permit removal to the federal court. FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 2(a) (Proposed 2005) in ALI
ANALYSIS & PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 12 (preemptive federal standards); id.
§§ 8(a)-(b) (concurrent federal and state court original jurisdiction; removal).
28 For a summary of the events leading up to the Hague Conference
negotiations, see Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
271 (1994).
26

27
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29
encouragement of the United States Department of State,"
presumably eager for assistance in the Hague negotiations. The
project focused initially on drafting a statute for American
implementation of the hoped-for broad convention.
It was
forcefully argued at the ALI that if the ALI were to propose a
federal statute on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments that did not contain a reciprocity requirement, the
position of the American negotiators at The Hague would be
severely compromised. 30 Those negotiations, however, ultimately
failed. This not only deprived the reciprocity requirement of its
initial rationale -to assist in achieving an international judgments
convention acceptable to the United States-but also forced a
redirection of the ALI project from the preparation of a statute to
implement such an international convention to the preparation of a
stand-alone federal statute once the prospects for international
agreement had evaporated.
The requirement of reciprocity continues to be defended on the
necessarily speculative basis that it will provide needed leverage in
future bilateral negotiations to obtain better treatment of American
judgments. The hoped-for general convention was a game in
progress, with a definite objective and a finite timetable to achieve
that objective. An obvious, and desired, consequence of its
achievement would have been reciprocal acceptance of judgments
by the parties to the convention within its terms. Reciprocity
would be the essence of a convention and was, indeed, the purpose
of the negotiations. No such concrete prospect is now in sight.
There is only the hope of bilateral or multilateral negotiations of
unknown scope with as yet unidentified countries and within no
stated time frame, to be conducted by the State Department, whose
future ambitions and continuing interest in the matter, as against
its many other concerns, must necessarily be uncertain.

29 ALI ANALYSIS & PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 12, at xiii.

3o See Peter D. Trooboff, Esq., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the
American Law Institute (May 15, 2002), in 79 A.L.I. PRoc. 309, 359-60 (2002).
I want to suggest that failure to include the reciprocity provision,
nothing could more easily undermine the effort to negotiate what's going
on in The Hague today. I say that, having been on the delegation for the
last 10 years and bent my sword a great deal on trying to convince others
that they should give us what we gave them a century ago.
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Introduction of the reciprocity requirement will inevitably
spawn satellite litigation over whether the requirement is satisfied
by the foreign country of origin of the judgment sought to be
enforced. If reciprocity is not shown, the merits of the case must be
retried, a burden on the parties and an American court that the
doctrine of res judicata would otherwise preclude. To establish
whether reciprocity exists may pose a formidable challenge. By
definition, a suit to enforce a judgment is only required because the
judgment debtor will not willingly pay it. It can thus be expected
that the judgment debtor will seize on whatever may be the
possibilities to litigate the issue of reciprocity. It is not difficult to
predict that in many cases expert evidence will be required, and if
the case is in a state court, an intermediate appeal may be
available.
To give a taste of what may be in store for us, consider the
following:
The proposed statute refers to "comparable" judgments. What
is being compared? The proposed statute necessarily speaks in
generalities: the American court "shall, as appropriate, inquire" as
to whether the courts of the state of origin deny enforcement to
judgments of various kinds (five categories are listed), and it "may
also take into account other aspects of the recognition practice of
courts of the state of origin ... "31
Are jury cases "comparable" to non-jury cases? If the country
of origin of the foreign judgment requires every judgment to
contain a summary statement of the facts found and law applied hardly an irrational requirement, one might think-and thus
refuses to enforce, among others, judgments entered on jury

31 FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 7(c) (Proposed
2005) in ALI ANALYSIS & PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 12. The court's inquiry
"does not aim to find precise congruence between judgments issued by courts
issued in the United States and the judgments for which recognition or
enforcement is sought .... The [§ 7(c)] list is illustrative, not exhaustive, and no
one factor is conclusive." Id. § 7(c) cmt. F. Noting that a "recurring issue" is the
approach taken abroad to American tort judgments, the commentary to the
statute states, "The fact that tort judgments from a given country could not pass
the test of reciprocity might not show lack of reciprocity with respect to other
kinds of judgments ....
" (emphasis added). Id. The examination of reciprocity in
at least some cases promises to be intensely fact-specific, time-consuming and
expensive.
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verdicts, may the American court enforce a (necessarily non-jury)
judgment?
If the country of origin will not enforce judgments based upon
long-arm jurisdiction where the facts relevant to the finding of
jurisdiction are unrelated to the cause of action, does this require
the American court to refuse to enforce a foreign judgment entered
on an unexceptionable jurisdictional basis?
Suppose that lack of reciprocity is conceded or established, but
the foreign judgment was rendered by a court specifically chosen
by the parties pursuant to a choice of court agreement. Does the
reciprocity requirement give the losing party the right to repudiate
its solemn agreement and successfully oppose recognition of the
judgment in the United States?
How will reciprocity be determined if relevant judgments on
the issue of reciprocity, either in this country or the country of
origin, are inconsistent?
With fifty state jurisdictions and thirteen federal circuits,
diverse decisions in the United States are to be expected. Doctrinal
controversy over what does or does not constitute reciprocity can
only feed the fire. The Supreme Court, if it chooses to do so, can
ultimately bring some degree of order to bear, but how soon or
how often will it intervene?
4.
In every case where enforcement of a foreign judgment is
denied because of a finding as to lack of reciprocity, the winning
party is deprived of its victory and not because of any defect in the
proceedings leading to the judgment sought to be enforced. The
reciprocity requirement comes into play only when the judgment
in question otherwise calls for enforcement under applicable law,
for if that were not the case, the issue of reciprocity need not be
addressed. So what is at issue is a judgment rendered by a court
system that provides impartial tribunals and processes compatible
with American notions of due process where the foreign court had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 32 where there is no
evidence of fraud or inadequate notice, where the cause of action
sued upon was not repugnant to relevant American public policy,
and where the foreign proceeding was not contrary to an

32 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(a) (1970) (stating the primary grounds for the nonrecognition of a foreign country money judgment).
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agreement between the parties that the dispute was to be settled
otherwise than by proceedings in that court (for example, by
arbitration). 33 The party thus deprived of rights under the foreign
judgment is penalized, not for any cause for which that party is
responsible, but because the American court refusing enforcement
decides that some hypothetical American judgment in some other
hypothetical case would not, or might not, be enforced by (some or
all of the) courts in the country of origin. And that, in turn, is
because the United States and the country of origin have not, for
whatever reason, come to agreement on provisions for the
enforcement of judgments. In short, the American court, asked to
enforce a judgment otherwise entitled to recognition under the
relevant American law, but precluded from doing so for lack of
reciprocity, finds itself, in effect, the obligatory servant of the
public policy of the country of origin.
5.
The fourth point, related to the first, is more a political than a
legal question: will the introduction of a reciprocity requirement
achieve the hoped-for leverage to overcome the putative obstacles
to acceptance of American judgments abroad?
The recent unsuccessful negotiations at The Hague presumably
sought to reduce such obstacles, with the threat of federal
legislation introducing a reciprocity requirement hanging
overhead. For whatever aggregate of reasons, that strategy was
unsuccessful. Will it succeed now? And if so, how long must we
wait to harvest the fruit, in the meantime refusing enforcement of
foreign judgments? Aficionados of game theory, who, indeed,
have weighed in on the reciprocity controversy, 34 can be left to
prove their case, if they can. For the rest of us, history is not
encouraging. The United States has pursued aggressive strategies
on other aspects of international litigation- those dealt with by
two previous Hague Conventions to which the United States is a
party, the Hague Evidence Convention and the Hague Service

33 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b) (1970) (enumerating other grounds for nonrecognition).
34 See, e.g., Susan L. Stevens, Commanding International Judicial Respect:
Reciprocity and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 26 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 115, 135-58 (2002) (applying game theory analysis to the
proposed ALI statute in order to explain why the statute should contain a
reciprocity requirement).
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Convention-and has implemented amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that appear to invite litigants in the
federal courts to violate foreign law. There is scholarly literature
35
suggesting that this course of action has been counterproductive.
Did the memory of it contribute to the failure of the Hague
negotiations this time? If the variant of strong-arm tactics reflected
in the new reciprocity proposal draws forth not acquiescence to
some of our current practices, jurisdictional and other, but rather
resistance, do we promote, or do we retard, acceptance of
American judgments abroad?
As the City Bar report points out, there have been favorable
changes in foreign attitudes toward American litigation practices
and resulting judgments. For example, the French practice of
rdvision au fond (review of the merits), which was at issue in the
Johnston case, was abandoned by the Cour de Cassation in 1964.36
The fear of possible enforcement in the European Union of a
judgment against an American rendered on the basis of exorbitant
jurisdiction, although it figures as a nightmare in academic writing,
has apparently yet to be realized in practice over the nearly forty
years that the Brussels Convention (now the Brussels Regulation)
has been in effect.37 Do we encourage or discourage further
favorable changes by adoption of the reciprocity requirement?
We should recognize that at bottom, what the proposed
reciprocity requirement aims at is to retain features of the
American civil litigation process, largely rejected elsewhere as
justifiable elements of due process, while forcing the results of
what are taken to be our procedural eccentricities on the rest of the
world to some larger extent than has been possible to date. In
other words, having failed to reach agreement at The Hague, we
will now attempt to exact through introduction of a reciprocity
requirement what could not be obtained at The Hague. Will it
work? Or will it have negative consequences? Time alone will tell,
and in the meantime, which may be a long time, private litigants
35 See SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON
JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 74-117 (2003) (reviewing the history of

German cooperation in U.S. litigation after World War II); Stephen B. Burbank,
The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law For International Civil Litigation, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (1994).
36 City Bar Survey, supra note 19, at 393.
37 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a Multinational Judgments
Convention: A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289,
303 (1994).
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will pay the price.
American involvement in international commercial arbitration
may offer a useful perspective on what can be achieved. The
United Nations Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, commonly referred to as the New York Convention, was
negotiated in 1958 at a conference in New York under UN
auspices. There was an American delegation at the conference, but
it was instructed to maintain a low profile. 38 At the conclusion of
the conference the delegation's report "strongly" recommended
against American participation in the Convention. One of the
major reasons offered for this was an argument from federalism:
arbitration was then mainly a matter of state law, which in many
states refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate, so that effective
American adherence to the Convention would thus make
39
substantial changes in United States domestic law.
When pressure to accede to the New York Convention became
intense a decade later, the United States took the plunge. But the
only choice open to it was to accept the Convention as it stood.
Renegotiation was not an option, and in fact was not seriously
considered. The reason for that no doubt lies in the fact that
international commercial arbitration in the United States is,
generally speaking, much like arbitration elsewhere. In any case, it
depends upon initial party consent and reserves to the parties a
determinant role in the composition of the arbitral tribunal and a
major role in the organization of the procedure to be followed, if
they choose to exercise their powers.
This contrasts sharply with the vastly different procedures in
civil litigation in the United States as compared with litigation in

38 United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, May
20-June 10, 1958, Official Report of the United States Delegation (August 15, 1958) (on
file with author).

In accordance with its instructions, the United States Delegation
participated in the conference in a limited way. It did not attempt to
exert a strong influence on the content of the convention, confining itself
to exposition of its views on matters of basic principle and emphasizing
the value of the pragmatic as opposed to the multilateral convention
approach to progress in arbitration.
Id. at 2.
39 Id. at 22-24. It was only in its decision in 1984 in Southland Corp. v. Keating
that the Supreme Court announced that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925,
despite its text and its legislative history, was in fact substantive congressional
legislation preempting inconsistent state arbitration law. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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other countries. 40 In the matter of civil court judgments, the United
States was unwilling to sign on to the Lugano Convention (the
counterpart to the Brussels Convention open to non-EU member
states), even if one is prepared to assume that it would have been
invited to do so had it wanted the invitation. 41 To take that step
would have involved, among other matters, major sacrifices in
American jurisdictional theories and practices -concessions the
United States was presumably unwilling to make, and concessions
that it was recommended the United States not make for both
42
policy and constitutional reasons.
CONCLUSION

Instead of introducing a reciprocity requirement as a
prerequisite to the enforcement of foreign judgments, may it not be
the part of wisdom that we "rather bear those ills we have than fly
to others that we know not of?" 43 Is "ills," indeed, the right word?
In the matter of judgment recognition, American law may stand
where it ought to stand: open to the world, conscious of the need
to bring litigation to a close, and focused on the deficiencies, if any,
in the particular foreign judgment sought to be enforced so as to do
justice between the parties. One can readily accept that the
enforcement of foreign judgments is properly a national concern
and thus appropriately made subject to a national standard in
place of a variety of state laws. It does not follow, however, that
individual rights, the protection of which is surely also a national
concern-rights that rest on a foreign judgment not otherwise
subject to challenge - should be sacrificed in the pursuit of a
political abstraction.
40 "America... has a set of procedural characteristics that seem to set it off
from almost all of the rest of the world." Richard L. Marcus, Putting American
Procedural Exceptionalism Into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 709
(2005). See also Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism" and Comparative
Procedure,50 AM. J. CoMp. L. 277, 278 (2002).
41 The late Professor von Mehren thought it "unlikely" that the United States
would be invited to join the Lugano Convention, and constitutionally impossible
for it to do so, even if invited, because some of the jurisdictional bases of
judgments that it would have been required to enforce could not pass muster
under the Due Process Clause. von Mehren, supra note 28, at 280-81.
42 A number of scholars argued strenuously against concessions that would
seem to have been required in order to obtain from the Hague negotiations a
convention satisfactory to the other negotiating parties. E.g., Lowenfeld, supra
note 37; von Mehren, supra note 28, at 280-82; Weintraub, supra note 18.
43 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
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